U-boat Archive - Army Antisubmarine Command History





	Chapter V

	CONCLUSION

	The story told in this study resembles nothing else in the history of the Army Air Forces. The Antisubmarine Command grew out of a combination of necessity and confused jurisdiction. It came into being essentially because no adequate preparation had been made to meet the submarine emergency. Its forerunner, the I Bomber Command, had been asked suddenly to assume responsibility for a kid of patrol activity hitherto jealously guarded by the Navy as one of its own peculiar functions, and one for which the air unit had no special training. It possessed an air striking force and that was immediately thrown into the gap made by the U-boats in the scheme of Western Hemisphere defense. It was to give this extraordinary mission something like precise organization, and in a sense to legalize it as a function of the Army Air Forces, that the command was created. In an effort to fulfill its mission, the Army Air Forces, through its Antisubmarine Command, planned to carry the fight as soon as practicable to the enemy. On both the legal and strategical ground this command became the center of a controversy which overshadowed in importance its actual operations.

	Those operations, nevertheless, contributed significantly to the defeat of the U-boat in the Atlantic. It is more than possible that they might have contributed considerably more had they been controlled

	225



	226

	by AAF agencies. As it was, much of the strength of the command remained tied to areas of defensive patrols, lacking the kind of hunting for which the squadrons were being trained and equipped. Most significant is the fact that at the time of its dissolution the Antisubmarine Command was for the first time nearing a level of experience, equipment, and general efficiency toward which its personnel had been working since the days of the I Bomber Command. Many antisubmarine authorities therefore viewed with regret its withdrawal from the Battle of the Atlantic, especially at a time then the enemy appeared to be on the verge of defeat. It was felt that, regardless of the quality of Navy pilots or the nature of naval strategic doctrine, months would pass before the Navy could hope to build up a force of long-range antisubmarine aircraft as powerful and as experienced as that of the AAF Antisubmarine Command. And the ugly fact persisted that the enemy, though beaten, still possessed large numbers of U-boats in the fall of 1943, and his capabilities for inflicting damage on Allied shipping remained substantial.

	Yet it would be romantic to suggest that the decision to eliminate the Antisubmarine Command was an operational decision, or even one arising from the basic controversy concerning the strategic value of antisubmarine air forces. The final deliberations turned not on the record of this command or its potentialities nor on the doctrine of the strategic offensive, toward which the Navy was itself gradually tending, but on the question of jurisdiction over long-range, land-based air striking forces engaged in overwater operations. On this



	227

	level the controversy came close to testing the raison d'etre of the Army Air Forces itself.

	On this level of policy, the antisubmarine controversy points to certain lessons of long-term importance. It emphasizes, of course, the need for closely integrated and clearly defined command in joint operations. It also illustrates the essential unity of air power. The chief characteristics of air power are its adaptability and its fluidity. Plans laid on the basis of rigid distinctions of area and function are likely to end in confusion and frustration, a fact proved by the experience of the I Bomber Command during the early months of the war when it found itself handicapped by training which had been carefully restricted to overland operations and inshore patrol. And air power must be employed to suit its peculiar character rather than borrowed from older military theory. In the light of these conclusions the settlement embodied in the Arnold-McNarney-McCain agreement appears to be a compromise, logically unsound, in which the division of air power into naval and Army branches was artificially perpetuated. Yet it was the only way around a problem which at the moment could not be eliminated, and it contained an element of reason in that it reinvested the Navy with a responsibility, originally and normally naval, namely, the protection of shipping. Yet it undoubtedly left the question of the ultimate control of strategic air power unanswered.



	228

	On the level of actual operations, the story of the Antisubmarine Command is less rewarding. Except for the activity of the 479th and 480th Groups in the eastern Atlantic, it is a story of hard work and frustration, in which is told how a great deal of effort and material was expended in an effort to build up a powerful fighting machine which was never allowed to function as its creators meant it to, and which was disassembled just when it was about to become for the first time fully operational. It is a story of much promise and relatively little fulfillment of great but largely unrealized potentialities. In August 1943, AAFAC equipment was nearing completion, the research program was about to provide the command with special weapons and devices which would greatly have enhanced its effectiveness, the training program was on the point to realizing the high plans laid down for it, and the entire organization was on the verge of becoming the mobile, air striking force which General Marshall had hoped to see deployed on a broad, aggressive strategic plan. In this sense the story is a brilliant prelude to anticlimax.

G L O S S A R Y

AAFAC	Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command
ACC	Atlantic Convoy Conference
ACV	Auxiliary carrier
AFABI	AC/AS, Intelligence
AFAEP	AC/AS, Plans
AFDTS	Director of Technical Service
AFRDB	Director of Bombardment
AFREQ	Requirements Division, AC/AS, Operations, Commitments and Requirements
AMSA	Ammunition Supply Authorities
AOC	Air Officer Commanding
ASC	Air Service Command
ASF	Air Service Forces
ASWORG	Antisubmarine Warfare Operations Research Group
AWIG	Antisubmarine Wing

CAP	Civil Air Patrol
CPS	Combined Staff Planners

DC/S	Deputy Chief of Staff
DF	Direction Finder

EDC	Eastern Defense Command
ESF	Eastern Sea Frontier
ETO	European Theater of Operations

GSF	Gulf Sea Frontier

JCNW	Joint Committee on New Weapons and Equipment
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff

LR	Long Range

MAD	Magnetic Airborne Detector
MIR	Monthly Intelligence Report

OPD	Operations Division, War Department General Staff
OTU	Operational Training Unit

RCAF	Royal Canadian Air Force
RCN	Royal Canadian Navy
RDF	Radio Direction Finder

SCR	Signal Corps Radio Equipment
SDC	Southern Defense Command

VLR	Very Long Range
VP	Navy Patrol (squadron)

WDGS	War Department General Staff

229

FOOTNOTES

Chapter I

Excerpts from Eastern Sea Frontier War Diary, Dec. 1941, in Three Historical Essays Relating to Army Antisubmarine Activities [Three Essays], 26 April 1944, Tab I H, in AAFAC files; Report by Maj. A. Standish to Secretary of War for Air [Standish Report], 1 Dec. 1943, 3 in AAFAC file 100.01.

Standish Report, 5. The following table of shipping losses is taken from memo to CG AAFAC from Maj. W. Jackson, Assistant A-3, AAFAC, 7 March 1943, in Three Essays, Tab I I.

	ESF		GSF		TOTAL
	SHIPS	TONNAGE	SHIPS	TONNAGE	SHIPS	TONNAGE
Jan.	13	92,995	--	--	13	92,995
Feb.	14	94,054	5	34,531	19	128,585
March	27	167,257	3	26,221	30	193,478
April	24	133,265	2	5,256	26	138,521
May	5	23,326	42	226,415	47	249,741
June	13	73,585	20	88,705	33	162,290
July	3	17,563	15	56,137	18	73,700
Aug.	--	--	3	9,489	3	9,489
Sep.	--	--	1	6,511	1	6,511
Oct.	--	--	--	--	--	--
Nov.	--	--	--	--	--	--
Dec.	--	--	--	--	--	--

Standish Report, 2.

Later designated Eastern Sea Frontier.

Ltr., Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier to Chief of Naval Operations, 22 Dec. 1941, in Three Essays, Tab I A. Cf. Standish Report, 3.

The convoy system was inaugurated formally 15 May 1942. Ltr., Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier to Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, 14 May 1942, in Three Essays, Tab I N.

Standish Report, 6.

War Diary, Dec. 1941, quoted in Three Essays, Tab I B.

Ibid., Jan. 1942, in Three Essays, Tab I E.

231

10.

Ltr., Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier to COMINCH, 14 Jan. 1942, in Three Essays, Tab I C.

11.

Extract from ESF War Diary, Jan. 1942, in Three Essays Tab I D.

12.

Col. D. R. Lyon "History & Organization of the Army Air Forces Anti-Submarine Command" [Lyon History], n.d., in AAFAC files 100.031, Monthly Antisubmarine Summary, Jan. 1943, 32. According to this account, the squadrons principally involved were the 20th, 43rd, and 96th Bombardment Squadrons.

13.

When activated, on 5 September 1941, the I Bomber Command consisted of a headquarters squadron, three heavy and one medium bombardment groups, a similar number of reconnaissance squadrons, and a single pursuit group.

14.

Lyon History.

15.

Ltr., Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier to COMINCH, 14 Jan. 1942, in Three Essays, Tab I C.

16.

ESF War Diary, in Three Essays, Tabs I F and I G.

17.

Lyon History.

18.

Ltr., Hq. I Bomber Command to CG 1st AF, 14 Jan. 1942, in AAFAC file 112.

19.

See Below, 13-14.

Col. C. A. McHenry, "The Antisubmarine Command of the Army Air Forces" [McHenry History], 13 Oct. 1943, prepared for release in the Army and Navy Journal. In AAFAC file 100.031.

21.

Report from W/C P. F. Canning, RAF, to Capt. J. T. G. Stapler, USN, Col H. D. Smith, 1st AF, and Lt. Col. R. B. Williamson, I Bomber Comd., 17 Feb. 1942 in AAFAC file 001. See also file 115.51.

22.

The following table is from Standish Report:

I BOMBER COMMAND AND ENEMY ACTIVITY

EASTERN AND GULF SEA FRONTIERS

_____________I BOMCM_____________________Ships Sunk_________________

	HOURS FLOWN	U-BOATS ATTACKED	NO.	TONNAGE	EST., AVERAGE DAILY U/B DENSITY
Jan. 42	3,134	1	13	92,955	3.4
Feb.	4,766	3	19	128.585	5.9
March	7,247	4	30	193,478	5.7

232

_____________I BOMCM_____________________Ships Sunk_________________

	HOURS FLOWN	U-BOATS ATTACKED	NO.	TONNAGE	EST., AVERAGE DAILY U/B DENSITY
April	6,328	11	26	138,521	8.1
May	6,618	20	47	249,741	11.1
June	5,439	21	33	162,290	9.0
July	6,799	11	18	73, 700	14.9
Aug.	5,685	6	3	9,489	8.5
Sep.	6,822	3	1	6,511	4.7
Oct.	6,410	1	0	0	2.2
	59,248	81	190	1,055,270

23.

Ibid., 10.

24.

Established shortly before Pearl Harbor, the CAP felt that it could be of service in the work of coastal patrol, and in February had submitted a plan for the employment of its forces. Memo, Maj. Gen. M. F. Harmon, C/AS, to Lt. Gen. L. F. McNair, C/S GHQ, U. S. Army, 11 Feb. 1942 in AAFAC file 280. Originally under the operational control of the I Air Support Command, the CAP wa placed under that of the I Bomber Command 19 August 1942. See AAFAC file 280.012.

25.

See below, Chap. IV.

26.

See below, n. 52.

27.

Reference data attached to memo, Arnold to Marshall, 21 Feb. 1942 in Plans III-R-Bk. 1. Reference is made here to Act of 5 June 1920 (41 Stat.954) as amended by Sec. 1, Act of 2 July 1923 (44 Stat. 780). Congress was declared competent to limit the jurisdiction of the armed forces in memo from Secretary of War, 28 August 1929.

28.

Copy in Office of AC/As Plans.

29.

Ibid., par. 19 e, f, g.

30.

Ibid., par. 20 c.

31.

Ibid., par. 32 f.

32.

Ibid., par. 20 and 23.

33.

See correspondence in Plans III-R Book 1, under November and December 1941, for discussion concerning proposed revision of Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow #5, and of Joint Action.

233

34.	Ltr., Hq. 1st AF to CG I Bomber Comd., 5 Nov. 1941, in AAFAC files.

35.	Joint Action, Chap. V, Sec. III, par. f. THe last really effective opportunity for joint exercises was in connection with "Minor Joint Air Exercise No. 1," 17-22 April 1939. Prior to that maneuver, the 100-mile limit had been relaxed, but not in time for any practice to be undertaken; and subsequent practice flights of this sort were rendered impracticable by a regulation stating that permission for each must be received from the Navy 15 days ahead of time. Joint exercises in 1940-41 involved very small participation on the part of the First Air Force, owing to the general Air Corps policy of concentrating for the time being primarily on expansion. This entire subject is developed in Chapter IV, History of the I Bomber Command, Part One, page 256, received, in draft, from the unit historian [Draft History], in AAFAC file 001.2.

36.	Ltr., Hq. I Bomber Comd. to CG 1st AF, 8 Nov. 1941, in AAFAC file 001. See also other correspondence in folder, "Joint Army Navy Plans before Pearl Harbor."

37.	Joint Action, Chap. III, par. 8 (1) (d) and Chap. V, Sec. II., par. j (2).

38.	Report of Minor Joint Exercise No. 1 New England and New York Sectors, 17-21 April 1939, analyzed in Draft History.

39.	Memo, Adm. E. J. King to Gen. Arnold, 20 Feb. 1942, in Plans III-R, Bk. 1; ltr., King to Arnold, 5 March 1942 in Plans III-R, Bk. 2.

40.	Memo, King to Arnold, 20 Feb. 1942, and memo for Arnold, 15 Jan. 1942, in Plans III-R Bk.1. By 1 July 1944, 200 additional B-24's and 500 B-25's were to be made available to the Navy.

41.	Review of correspondence, ltr., C/S, to COMINCH, 17 July 1942 and attached memo for record, in Plans III-R Bk. 1. In 1942, the Navy received 51. By August 1943, the AAFAC planned to have a force of 240 heavy bombers, including the two squadrons partially equipped with B-17's. Memorandum Report to the Secretary of War "The Acute Problem of Ocean-borne Transport and Supply" [Bowles Report], by Dr. E. L. Bowles, 3 March 1943, 5, copy at present in AAFAC files. A report from the Chief, Statistical Control Air Staff, Management Control, 19 March 1943, attached to memo from the President to Chief of Staff, U. S. Army and COMINCH, 18 March 1943, in AAFAC file 575.6, puts at 52 the number of B-24's delivered to the Navy.

42.	Ltr., Arnold to King, 25 Feb, 1942, Plans III-R-2 Bk. 1.

43.	Memo for Mr. R. A. Lovett, entitled "Unity of Command vested in the Army for Coastal Frontiers," n.d., in Plans III-R-2 Bk. 1.

234

44.	Ltr., Arnold to King, 9 May 1942, in Plans III-R-2 Bk. 2.

45.	Ltr., Maj. Gen. Follett Bradley, CG 1st AF, to Brig. Gen. W. T. Larsen, CG, I Bomber Comd, 26 May 1942.

46.	See below, n. 52.

47.	Ltr., Arnold to Maj. Gen. W. H. Frank, CG, 3rd AF, 29 May 1942, in AAF 384. 7-A.

48.	Ltr., Col. F. L. Anderson, Acting Dir., AFRDB to Bradley, 1 July 1942, in AAG 384.7-A.

49.	Draft in AAFAC files, entitled "I Bomber Command." Cf. Standish Report, 2.

50.	Ibid., Conclusion, 13. See Monthly Intelligence Report, AAFAC, July 1943, 14, for charts illustrating expansion and relocation.

51.	Joint Action, Chap. II, Par. 8 (a) and (b). Cf. Draft History.

52.	Rad. from C/S, 25 March 1942, in AAFAC file 001.

53.	Lt. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney's notes on trip to 1st AF and I Bomber Comd., 23 April 1942, in Plans III-R-2 Bk. 1.

54.	Memo for Arnold, 20 May 1942 from AFRDB; memo for TAG from OPD, 27 May 1942; ltr., Hq. 3rd AF to CG AAF, 15 June 1942; all in Plans III-R-3 Bk. 1.

55.	Memo for Col. Glantzberry from Col. F. R. Pitts, 20 Aug. 1942; McNarney's notes, cited above, n. 53; both in Plans III-R-2 Bk. 1.

56.	The I Bomber Command still, theoretically, had the job of general coastal defense in addition to its antisubmarine duties. See below, Chap. IV.

57.	Memo AC/S, OPD to CG EDC, 20 May 1942; AC/S, OPD to CG AAF, 20 May 1942; both in AAFAC file 113.3. The latter is roughly the same as the former, except that it alone contains the directive requesting a reorganized bomber command.

58.	Memo AC/S to CG AAF, 20 May 1942, and attached memo for CG AAF from Acting AC/S, 22 May 1942, in AAFAC file 113.3.

59.	See AAFAC files 115.51 and 115.52.

60.	Report, "The Coastal Command System of Operational Control," 17 Feb. 1942, in AAFAC 115.51. See conference with Comdr. R. B. Martinean, RAF Coastal Command, 17 July 1942, in AAFAC

235

	file 115.52 for additional information on the English system.

61.	Report by W/C S. R. Gibbs, RAF "on visits to units of the First Air Forces," in AAFAC file 115.51.

62.	Draft plans, n. d., unsigned, in AAFAC files 113.3 and 001.

63.	Notes for conference on improvement in antisubmarine operations, 1 June 1942, in AAFAC file 113.3 and 001. Cf. memo for AC/S, OPD from AC/S Plans, 4 June 1942, in Plans III-R-2 Bk. 1, which is virtually the same plan.

64.	See draft plans.

65.	Ibid. In the patrolled area an airplane density of 1:15,000 square miles should be maintained.

66.	Ibid.

67.	Document, unsigned, 19 Dec. 1942, "The Strategic Control of our Antisubmarine Campaign." in AAFAC file 575.201.

68.	Ltr., Air Marshall P. B. Joubert, RAF, to Lord Halifax, 16 Aug. 1942, in Three Essays, Tab II B. This letter was sent in answer to Lord Halifax's request for information concerning British experience which might be of help to the United States in its antisubmarine problem.

69.	Memo for King from McNarney, 26 May 1942, in AAFAC 001.

70.	Ltr., King to Marshall, 10 June 1942; ltr., King to Comdrs. ESF and GSF, 10 June 1943; both in AAFAC files 113.3 and 001.

71.	Memo, Marshal to King, 19 June 1942, in AAFAC file 001.

72.	Memo, King to Marshall, 21 June 1942 to Bowles Report (see above, n. 41), Tab XII B. This reference to an increase in allocation of Army planes was a repetition of an earlier suggestion, Ltr., King to Marshall, 10 June 1942, in AAFAC files 113.3 and 001.

73.	See above, n. 22; Standish Report, 9-10.

74.	Ibid., 10-11. Figures taken from COMINCH assessments.

75.	Ibid.

76.	See above, n. 2.

77.	See Charts in Monthly Intelligence Summary, AAFAC, Nov. 1942, 8-9.

236

78.	Analysis of U. S. Aircraft Attacks on U/Boats, Memo 20, prefaced by Antisubmarine Warfare Operations Research Gp., 7 Dec. 1942, p. 4. In this connection it should be noted that half, or a significantly larger proportion, of the radar contacts were made by Army planes.

79.	History, 1st Search Attack Gp. Langley Field, Va. Chap II, 21 and App. 19 B.

80.	At least one German U-boat commander agreed with this interpretation. Early in June 1942, when the force of the U. S. antisubmarine measures was just beginning to be felt, the rescued captain of a U-boat sunk by a I Bomber Command plane off Cape Hatteras stated that he did not believe German submarine successes in American waters could be maintained, owing to the frequency of depth-bomb attacks. McHenry History.

81.	Estimated at 859,000 tons for November, as compared to 575,885 for October. Monthly Intelligence Summary, AAFAC, Nov. and Dec. 1942.

82.	See review of SADU activities in memo for CG AAF from Brig. Gen. T. T. Handy, AC/S, 27 June 1942; memo for S/W from Dr. Bowles, 7 Aug. 1942; both in AAFAC files 113.3 and 001.

83.	Ibid. See also another plan submitted 22 August 1942 and constructed on roughly similar lines. Attached to Ltr., Lt. Col. P. C. Ashworth to Col. R. L. Harper, 22 Aug. 1942, in AAFAC files 113.4 and 001.

84.	Ltr., Marshall to King, 14 Sep. 1942, in Bowles Report, Tab XIV A.

85.	Ltr., King to Marshall, 17 Sep. 1942, in Bowles Report, Tab XIV B.

86.	Memo for CG AAF from McNarney, 22 Sep. 1942 in Bowles Report, Tab XIV C.

87.	GO No. 84, 1st AF, 15 Oct. 1942, in AAFAC file 210. The original title, "Army Air Forces Anti-Submarine Command," was changed to Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command on 20 Nov. 1942. Memo from Maj. F. E. Bauer, 20 Nov. 1942 AAFAC file 212. Although given prior approval by Navy authorities, the command was welcomed by Admiral King with marked lack of enthusiasm. In the 38th meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 20 Oct. 1942, he asked whether the announcement by the War Department of the constitution of the AAFAC, "now a fait accompli," was meant to convey the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Notes on JCS, 38th meeting, attached to JCS 93/1, in J/CCS Div., AFAEP.

88.	Ltr., Col. F. C. Milner, CG, AAFAC, 28 Dec. 1942; memo from Milner, 28 Dec. 1942; ltr., Maj. Gen. G. E. Stratemeyer to Air Marshal L. S. Breadner, Ottawa, Canada, 9 June 1943; all in AAFAC files 211, 211.1, 212.

Chapter II

1.	Monthly Intelligence Summary, AAFAC, Nov. 1942; Standish Report, 18. In October 1942, I Bomber Command reported 22 DB-7 B's and A-20's, 19 A-29's 12 B-17's, 14 B-18's, 3 B-24's, 35 B-25's, 43 B-34's. Of these aircraft, only 27 were listed as radar equipped. Ibid., 8 See App. 5 for station lists.

2.	See n. 84 Chap. I

3.	See n. 83 Chap. I.

4.	Bowles Report, Tab XIII.

5.	Ltr., AAG to Larson, 28 Dec. 1942, quoted in Standish Report, 17.

6.	In JCS 93, considered in 31st meeting of JCS, 1 September 1942, information was requested on 500 additional aircraft which the Navy wished provided for antisubmarine patrol. In JCS 93/1, (19 October 1942) General Arnold outlined a plan for the ultimate deployment of 416 Army planes. This plan was approved in the 38th Meeting of JCS.

6a.	Ltr., TAG, to CG AAF, 17 Nov. 1942 in AG 320.5 (11-15-42); Ltr., Maj. Bower to CG AAF, 6 Jan. 1943, copies in AAFAC files 212 and 215. THe figure 19 is taken from JCS 93/1.

7	Ltr., CG AAFAC to CG AAF, 6 Jan. 1943, copies in AAFAC files 215 and 001.1.

7a.	Ibid.

8.	Ibid., 1st ind., n.d.

9.	R&R, Dir. of Technical Services [AFDTS] to AC/AS, A-3, 6 Jan. 1943, in AAFAC file 001.1.

10.	Memo, Dr. P. M. Morse, ASWORG, to AFDTS, 20 Jan. 1943, in PLans III-R-2 Bk. 1.

11.	After a detailed analysis, he set 6,000 as an upper and 800 as a lower limit, leaving 1,000 to 2,000 as a compromise, provided they could be moved easily from base to base to follow U-boat concentrations. Ibid.

12.	Memo ("unofficial") Dr. Morse to Larson, 5 Jan. 1943, in AAFAC files 001.1 and 591.

13.	Memo for JCS from Joint U. S. Committee on New Weapons and Equipment, (JCNW), 4 Jan. 1943, memo from JCNW to Deputy C/S, 6 Jan. 1943,

237

238

both in Plans III-R-2 Bk. 1. The latter document closely resembles Dr. Morse's report in the number of aircraft considered necessary in the North Atlantic. A similar opinion was experienced by Brig. Gen. H. H. McCelland, AFDTS, in memo for McNarney, 23 Jan. 1943, in AAG, Bulk file, Antisubmarine Command correspondence prior to 1 April 1943.

14.

Memo for CG AAF, from Brig. Gen. C. W. Russel, 3 Nov. 1942, in Three Essays, Tab II C.

15.

He estimated that 105 enemy submarines were operating in the Atlantic and that Germany was building between 20 to 25 a month.

16.

Memo for CG AAF, n.d. (probably January 1943), in AAFAC file 001.1.

17.

1st ind., Hq. AAF to Russel, 6 FEb, 1943 to brief of memo for CG AAF from Russel, n.d., in AAG 384, 7-A. See also ltr., C/S to COMINCH, 17 July 1942, in Plans III-R-2 Bk.1, in which a similar viewpoint is foreshadowed. In a memo for the Chief of Staff, 5 October 1942, in Plans III-R-2 Book 1, Lt. Gen. B. H. Somervell, Commanding General, ASF, had urged the bombing of submarine bases and yards as the principal target for the Eighth Air Force, and a necessary prerequisite to successful logistical operations in the European theatre. Arnold, summing up a discussion of the problem during the course of which he and Air Vice Marshal Slessor, RAF, had experienced divergent views, wrote in December what may be considered the official AAF position at the time:

The submarine right now is a terrible menace and it must be a target for our bombers. Their destruction is one of our primary problems. I am convinced therefore that we must hit them first where their component parts are made; second, where they are assembled; third, at their operating bases; and fourth, in the open sea.

Ltr., Arnold to Slessor, 4 Dec. 1942, in SAS 370.31 (Office of the Air Secretary.)

18.

R&R, AFAEP to AFABI, 28 Dec. 1942, in Plans III-R-2 Bk. 1.

19.

An Evaluation of the Air Effort against submarines, to 1 Jan. 1943, compiled by Intelligence Service, AAF, 8 Mar. 1943, in A-2 Library, US 9950 Shipping, K-17802.

20.

Ibid. Cf. memo for CG AAF from Col. D. R. Lyon and Col. Adrian Williamson, 27 Feb. 1943, in AAFAC file 001.1.

21.

Minority report submitted by Col. Williamson, one of two AAFAC members of Special Committee on Measures for Combating the Submarine Menace. CPS 56/3, 1 March 1943, Annex B to App. C.

239

22.	Memo for CG AAF from AFAEP, 21 Dec. 1942, in Plans III-R-2 Bk. 1; ltr., Hq. AAFAC to CG 25th Antisubmarine Wing/AWIG, 3 Feb. 1943, in AAFAC file 001.1.

23.	Memo for Brig. en. Upston, unsigned, n.d., (probably early in Feb. 1942, because in answer to a letter of 8 Feb. 1943), in AAFAC file 001.1. British ASV-2 equipment had been seriously compromised by the German detecting devices.

24.	See below.

25.	Memo, for Marshall from King, 8 Feb. 1943, in Three Essays, Tab II F.

26.	Memo for Upston. (See note 23 above.)

27.	Supplementary Report on the Air Effort against Submarines, prepared by A-5, 8th AF, 28 Feb. 1943.

28.	See Monthly Intelligence Report, AAFAC, April 1943, 13. Memo for CG AAFAC from Maj. W. Jackson, n.d., AAFAC file 001.1.

29.	Minutes of the Atlantic Convoy Conference, 4, in AAFAC file 575.5. On this score, the conference made some important recommendations which resulted in materially strengthening the convoy routes both in number of VLR aircraft and in the international organization. See ACC 3 and 3/1; Three Essays, II, 37-40.

30.	Minutes of ACC.2-3.

31.	Memo for CG AAF from Cols. Lyon and Wiliamson, 27 Feb. 1943, in AAFAC file 001.1. In the course of the discussions of the subcommittee of the CPS on the submarine menace, it came out that the total strength in VLR aircraft planned by Britain, Canada, and the United States exceeded the number considered necessary by 208 (260 were required, 468 planned by all agencies). Ibid.

32.	Memo for CG AAF from Russell, n.d., in AAFAC file 001.1.

33.	Memo for DC/S from JGNW, n.d., in Plans III-R-2 Bk. 1, under 6 Jan. 1943.

34.	Ibid. See also ltr., CG AAFAC to CG AAF, 22 June 1943, in AAFAC file 001.1; Memo, Dr. Bowles to Marshall, 3 March 1943, prefaced to Bowles Report.

35.	Ltr., Lt. Col. Jack Roberts to Air Vice Marshal Lloyd, AOC, NW African Coastal AF, 6 April 1943, in Letters of Col. Roberts, AAFAC files. Other references to this problem may be found throughout Col. Robert's letters. See also Ltr., CG AAFAC, to CG AAF, 5 Jan. 1943, in AAFAC file 001.0.

240

36.	"Proposed Reorganization of ASW Forces," AAFAC Liaison Office, 21 Jan. 1943, in AAFAC file 001.1.

37.	Memo. King to Marshall, 8 Feb. 1943, in Three Essays, Tab II F.

38.	Notes on 54th Meeting, CCS, 31 Dec. 1942, attached to CPS 56/D.

39.	Subcommittee created 5 Jan. 1943 as a result of CPS 56/D, dated 2 Jan. 1943. Memo for CG AAFAC from Cols. Lyon and Williamson, 27 Feb. 1943, in AAFAC file 001.1. Representatives were present from the following agencies: RAF, RN, USN, RCAF, and RCN.

40.	Ibid.

41.	CPS 56/3, Annex B to App. C.

42.	Plan attached to memo, Cols. Lyon and Williamson to CG, AAF, 27 Feb. 1943, in AAFAC file 001.1.

43.	"Proposed Reorganization of ASW Forces," issued by AAFAC Liaison Office, 21 Jan. 1943, in AAFAC file 001.1.

44.	Memo for DC/S from JCEW, in Plans III-R-2, Bk. 1, under 6 Jan. 1943.

45.	Notes on 76th Meeting, JCS, 27 April 1943 and on 82nd Meeting, CCS, 30 April 1943, attached to CCS 203.

46.	Minutes of AAC, 3.

47.	Ibid., 11.

48.	Ltr., the Present to C/S, and COMINCH, 18 March 1943, copies in AAFAC file 575, 6 and 001.1. Specifically, the President asked for a statement as to the number of B-24's the two services could operate at once from Newfoundland, Greenland, and Iceland, how soon the maximum number would be operating from each of these bases, how many ACV's were in use, and at what rate they might be increased. See below, n. 70.

49.	For status of foreign squadrons, as of 1 April 1943, see App. 7, this study. Memo for Arnold from Giles, 2 April 1943, in AAFAC file 001.1.

50.	Ltr., Chief of Bomb. Br., AFREQ to CG AAFAC, 2 April 1943, in AAFAC file 001.1.

51.	Memo, Arnold to Stratemeyer, 29 March 1943, in AAFAC file 001.1. This subject had received much attention in CCS and CPS deliberations. In CCS 189, 16 March 1943, a recommendation had been made to CCS from JCS to the effect that the urgent need for an immediate increase

241

in VLR aircraft in the antisubmarine campaign should be met by diverting 128 heavy bombers from the bombing of Germany. On 25 March 1943, Air Commander Strafford pointed out that only 8 VLR aircraft were available in the North Atlantic where heavy losses in shipping had occurred in the previous 2 weeks. Notes on CPS 49th Meeting, attached to CPS 49/D, 20 March 1943. In CCS 189/2, it was recommended that during April and May 1943, first priority in equipment and labor at all ASV modification centers be given to B-24's for antisubmarine service, and that the entire VLR, ASV-equipped B-24 output from modification centers during these months be similarly allocated, even at the expense of other theatres. These recommendations were accepted, substantially, in CCS 189/3.

52.

Ibid.

53.

R&R, comment 2, AFCCR to AFAEP, 29 April 1943, in AAFAC file 001.1. Planned allocations of VLR B-24 aircraft to the AAFAC were listed as follows.

April	40	September	67
May	26	October	52
June	21	November	54
July	31	December	36
August	56

54.

Memo for King from Marshall, 16 April 1943, in Plans III-R-2 Bk. 1.

55.

JCS 268, 19 April 1943, memo by C/S.

56.

Bowles Report, 20-21. The over-all average of attacks against submarines indicated that one sighting in 40 was fatal to the enemy. In England, the average had been considerably better than this; in America, considerably less. Ibid., 28. Dr. Bowles proposed using the British Coastal Command system of operational control, in which submarine positions and predictions would be given to the AAFAC each day, whereupon the command itself would then lay out its plans for the next day's operations. He depreciated the restrictions imposed on antisubmarine activity by the Navy's insistence on adhering to arbitrary sea frontier boundaries, both at home and abroad. Ibid., 20 and 21.

57.

Memo for Marshall and McNarney, 3 March 1943, attached to Bowles Report. For 1943, production schedules called for 6,400 B-24's in all. In 1942 the Navy had received 51 B-24's, and 343 were scheduled to go to the Navy in 1943. By August 1943 the AAFAC could only count on 175 additional long-range planes for its operational force. Ibid., 5. Cf. n. 55, above.

58.

Memo for Marshall from S/W Stimson, 14 March 1943. Copies in AAG 384.7 and AAFAC 1001.1.

242

59.	Ltr., Hq. AAFAC to CG AAF, 11 April 1943, in AAFAC file 001.1.

60.	Memo for JCS from AC/S, (JCS 268).

61.	Memo for King from Marshall, 11 May 1943, in Plans III-R-2 Bk. 1.

62.	Notes on 75th Meeting, JCS, 20 April 1943.

63.	JCS 268/1, 3 May 1943.

64.	Notes on 77th Meeting, JCS, 4 May 1943.

65.	Memo for Marshall from King, 30 April 1943, in Plans III-R-2 Bk. 1. He suggested that since the convoy systems in the South Pacific and the Southwest Pacific should be the same as that in the Atlantic, the Commander, Tenth Fleet should control it.

66.	Notes on 77th Meeting, JCS.

67.	Ibid.

68.	Memo fir King from Marshall, 11 May 1943 in Plans III-R-2 Bk. 1. It appears, however, that pending a decision on the Tenth Fleet proposal, antisubmarine forces were, in fact, administered by the JCS with COMINCH as their executive, a procedure which, in the above memo, General Marshall had admitted would cause complications. See Joint Directive from JCS to Comdr., S. Atlantic Force, and CG, S. Atlantic, 4 June 1943, in AAFAC file, OPerations, Ascension Island.

69.	Memo for C/S from OPD, 8 May 1943, in AAFAC file 001.1.

70.	Memo for King from Marshall, 11 May 1943, in Plans III-R-2 Bk. 1. General Marshall also nominated the man for the job, Maj. Gen. Willis H. Hale, then air Chief in Hawaii.

71.	Rad. issued by King, 19 May 1943, in AAFAC file 218.1. The organization became effective 20 May 1943.

72.	See Chap. III, n. 219 for figures on Navy allocations.

73.	Memo for CG AAF from Brig. Gen. B. W. Childlaw, 13 June 1943, in Plans III-R-2 Bk. 4.

74.	Memo for King from Marshall, 28 June 1943, in AAFAC file 001.1.

75.	See above, n. 30.

76.	Memo, Stimson to Marshall, 14 March 1943, in AAFAC 001.1.

243

77.	Ltr., Allied Antisubmarine Survey Board to COMINCH, 29 April 1943, in AAFAC 001.1.

78.	Notes on 79th Meeting, JCS, 10 May 1943.

79.	CCS 241, 21 May 1943.

80.	Minutes, 93rd Meeting, CCS, 22 May 1943, ref. CCS 241/1.

81.	Minutes, 88th Meeting, JCS, 22 May 1943, ref. CCS 241.

82.	Notes on 98th Meeting CCS, 14 June 1943, ref. CCD 241/5.

83.	Memo for Col. W. C. Sweeney, OPD from Larson, 10 June 1943, in AAFAC file 001.1.

84.	Memo for DC/S from Acting AC/S, OPD, 7 June 1943. Cf. attached draft memo for King from DC/S; both in AAFAC file 001.1.

85.	It was officially concurred in by General Marshall, 14 June 1943, on the basis of the informal concurrence of General Arnold, 12 June 1943. Notes on 98th Meeting, CCS; R&R, AFAEP to CG AAF, 12 June 1943, in Plans III-2-R Bk. 1.

86.	Memo "for discussion with Gen. Arnold" from Lt. Col. P. C. Crowen, in AAG Bulk file, AAFAC correspondence since 1 April 1943, I.

87.	Memo AC/S, OPD for CG AAF, 10 July 1943, in Dissolution of the Antisubmarine Command [Dissolution], Annex A-2, in AAFAC files.

88.	Memo for Marshall from King, 14 June 1943 in Dissolution, Annex A-1.

89.	Ltr., Stimson to McNarney, 25 June 1943, in Plans III-R-2 Bk. 2.

90.	Ibid.

91.	R&R, Chief of Air Staff to AFABI, 1 July 1943, in AAFAC file file 001.1 General Stratemeyer ordered that the attached memo from General Marshall be "incorporated in our historical record."

92.	Memo for King from Marshall, 28 June 1943, copy in App. 1.

92a.	See Dissolution for details regarding this transaction.

93.	Memo for Col. Gross from Lt. Col. Reynolds, AFRDB, in Plans III-R Bk. 4.

94.	Dissolution, Annex A-13.

244

95.	Memo for all AC/AS from AFREQ, 27 Oct. 1943, in AAG 384. 7-B.

96.	See papers filed for October 1943 in AAG 384.7-B; Dissolution, 19 ff.

CHAPTER III

Memo for King from Marshall, 19 June 1943, in Bowles Report, Tab XII A.

Memo for Marshall and McNarney, 3 March 1943, attached to Bowles Report.

Ibid. The higher figures came from report entitled "The Strategic Aerial Bombardment of Europe" [Strategic Bombardment], AFABI, 10 Sep. 1943, in AFIHI files, 1641-2. These figures were originally taken from tabulations made by the Office of Strategic Services.

Monthly Intelligence Report, [MIR] AAFAC, Aug. 1943, 6 and 10.

Strategic Bombardment, 10 Dec. 1943.

Ibid.

Ibid., 10 Sep. 1943; MIR, Aug. 1943, 20.

Strategic Bombardment, 19 Dec. 1943.

Ibid., MIR, July 1943.

10.

Some put the number of U-boats having to cross the transit area as high as 120. MIR Aug. 1943, 13.

11.

About 70 per cent of the total Atlantic fleet was estimated to be operating at one time, each cruise lasting about 2 months. Paper, Air Offensive against the U-boats in Transit, filed under 10 March 1943 in AAFAC file 597.1.

12.

MIR, June 1943, 20; Air Offensive against the U-boats in Transit.

13.

MIR, June 1943, 20.

14.

Air Offensive against the U-boats in Transit.

15.

Ibid.

16.

Ibid. The following statements, complete to the end of June 1943, give some idea of the persuasiveness of the argument in favor of the Bay offensive.

Month	Approx. Flying Hours	U-boats sighted	U-boats attacked	Flying Hours per sighting	% of Transit U-boats Attacked.
March	4100	42	24	97	20
April	3600	52	28	69	23

246

Month	Approx. Flying Hours	U-boats sighted	U-boats attacked	Flying Hours per sighting	% of Transit U-boats Attacked.
May	4600	99	65	46	54
June (27-1/3 days)	4700	52	25	76	23
	17000	255	142	67	30

There is a sharp contrast between this rate of sighting U-boats and the number of hours of flying which experience showed were required to obtain a sighting in other operational areas.

Area	Hours per sighting Jan. - Apr. 1943
Newfoundland and Nova Scotia	753
San Juan Sector	790
Trinidad Sector	2175
Guantanamo Sector	12194
Eastern Sea Frontier	20563
Gulf Sea Frontier	59216

It must, of course, be remembered that many of the planes used in these areas would not have been suitable for such operations as those in the Bay. MIR, June 1943, 20-21.

17.

These two squadrons were diverted from the western Atlantic in the first instance for the purpose of protecting TORCH shipping. Rad. NCXF (1) to Admiralty, 12 Feb. 1942, in Historical Documents of the 480th Antisubmarine Group (Annex to History of the 480th Antisubmarine Group [History, 480th Gp.] ) in AAFAC files.

18.

Memo for Maj. W. H. Jackson, AAF from Air Chief Marshal Sir John Slessor,. Comdr., RAF Coastal Command, 11 Oct. 1943, quoted in extenso in Three Essays, II, 15. Outer Gondola lay between 45-1/2° and 50° N and from 15° to 22° W. Inner Gondola lay between 45° and 48-1/2° N. and from 7° to 10° W.

19.

Ibid.

20.

See History, 480th Gp. for data on movement of units.

Letters of Col. Jack Roberts [Roberts ltrs.], Tabs 1 and 2, in AAFAC files. See also History, 480th Gp., Tab 2, 7-8.

22.

History, 480th Gp., Tab 2, 2. The unit, on 1 March 1943, became known as the 2037th Wing (Prov.), under direct control of the AAFAC.

247

	On 21 June 1943 it was again redesignated as the 480th Antisubmarine Group (Separate Special). Throughout the present study it will be referred to as the 480th Group.

23.	Ibid., 8.

24.	Ibid.

25.	Ibid.

26.	Ibid., 10. When all remaining combat crews arrived, Colonel Roberts estimated he would have in the 1st Squadron only 42 officers and 152 men, including 2 officers and 65 men attached from VIII Bomber Command. This amounted only to 50 per cent of the T/O personnel strength. Roberts Ltrs., Tab 2, 6.

27.	History, 480th Gp., 10

28.	Ibid., 11.

29.	Roberts Ltrs., Tabs 1, 2, 10.

30.	History, 480th Gp., 14.

31.	Ibid., 14-15. See also Roberts Ltrs., Tabs 1, 2, and 4; memo for Larson from Dr. Morse, 5 Jan. 1943, in AAFAC files 591 and 001.1.

32.	Ibid., 12.

33.	Ibid., 13. See also Standish Report, Annex 3.

34.	Ltr., Hq. 8th AF to CG ETOUSA, 25 March 1943, in AAG 384.7A.

35.	History, 480th Gp., 11; Roberts Ltrs., Tab 2, 8.

36.	Roberts Ltrs., Tab 2, 5.

37.	Ibid., Tab 4.

38.	Ibid., Tab 9.

39.	History, 480th Gp., 16. Cf. n. 41 below.

40.	See n. 16 above.

41.	History, 480th Gp., 15 ff. See also Evaluations in App. 2, this study. Only one of the three attacks thwarted by mechanical failure is included in the appendix. In this attack the U-boat was, however, effectively strafed.

248

42.	Ibid., 20.

43.	Ibid., 22.

44.	Coastal Command Review Feb. 1943, 1 and 3. This source only lists the five attacks for February in which the bombs did not "hang up."

45.	See ibid., March to June, for running story of Coastal Command operations in the Bay.

46.	Report of Naval Attache in London, Serial 1071, 17 March 1943, in AAFAC file 597.1., CCS 189/4, 22 April 1943, memo from Representative of the British Chiefs of Staff.

47.	Memo for AC/S, OPD from AFAEP, 12 April 1943, in AAFAC file 597.1. Although the Navy had, by 1 April 1943, received 111 B-24 aircraft from the Army, it was stated that none of them had on that date been employed in Atlantic antisubmarine operations.

48.	Ibid., The proposal of the British, as originally stated , was disposed of officially in CCS 189/6, 29 April 1943.

49.	Report of Naval Attache in London, 17 March 1943. In 53rd Meeting, CPS, 6 May 1943, Air Commodore Strafford urged that, if ASV equipped VLR planes could not be made available, those without radar be sent, because in daylight operations, special equipment would not be essential.

50.	Memo for DC/S from AC/S OPD, 7 June 1943, in AAFAC file 584.

51.	History of the 479th Antisubmarine Group, [History, 479th Gp.], 5, in AAFAC files.

52.	"Musketry" was bounded on the north by 47° 30' N, on the east by 09° 30' W, on the south by 43° 30' N and on the west by 11° 30' W. "Seaslug" was bounded on the north by 47° 30' N, on the east by 13° 00" W, on the south by 44° by 00' N, and on the west by 15° 00' W. These areas became effective 14 June 1943. For these and other dates on the Bay operations, see Monthly Antisubmarine Report, issued by the Admiralty, July 1943, page 15 and September 1943, page 15, in AFIHI files.

53.	Ltr., Col. Howard Moore, CO 479th Gp. to CG AAFAC, 18 July 1943, in AAFAC file 583.

54.	Ibid., See also History 479th Gp., I, 56.

55.	Ibid., I, 52-54.

56.	Ibid., I, 9.

249

57.	Rad., Slessor to Larson, 29 July 1943, in AAFAC file 583.

58.	Standish Report, Annex II, 3. Cf. revised COMINCH assessments, App. 2, this study.

59.	See chart of attacks by 479th Group on enemy submarines, App. 2, this study.

60.	See chart of encounters with enemy aircraft, App. 3, this study.

61.	Standish Report, Annex II, 4.

62.	See MIR, Aug. 1943, 13, for general discussion. Standish Report, Annex II, 4; Monthly Antisubmarine Reports, July to Sep. 1943.

63.	Standish Report, Annex II, 4.

64.	During these operations, Support Groups spent 575 "ship days" in the Bay, and Coastal Command aircraft flew 3,981 sorties. These figures do not include help received from the Moroccan Sea Frontier and from Gibraltar. Monthly Antisubmarine Report, Sep. 1943, 15.

65.	For discussion of this subject see report entitled, "Analysis of Anti-Submarine Warfare Operations in the Moroccan Sea Frontier Area" [Analysis], ASWORG, 22 July 1943, in Three Essays, Tab III D; ltr., H. Lardner, RAF Operations Research Section, to Capt. T. H. Solberg, American Embassy, London, 6 Sep. 1943 in ibid., Tab III E; History, 480th Gp., 35 ff.

66.	Ltr., Lardner to American Embassy.

67.	Analysis, ASWORG. This source estimates 25 enemy submarines to have been in the given area. Mr. Lardner, in letter referred to above, believed that no more then eight were ever deployed in the area at any one time.

68.	History, 480th Gp., 37-38. Figures quoted are based on COMINCH assessments.

69.	See chart of attacks by 480th Group on enemy submarines, App. 2, this study. See also History 480th Gp., 39.

70.	The advance air echelon arrived 11 March. The ground echelon arrived at the end of the month, having been delayed in Algiers, waiting transportation. History 480th Gp., 23. The status of the organization as of 26 March 1943 was as follows: 16 planes, 96 officers, 281 enlisted men in the flight echelon; 11 officers and 529 enlisted men in the ground echelon. Roberts Ltrs., Tab 16.

250

71.	Ibid., Tab 20.

72.	Ibid., Tabs 20 and 21.

73.	Ibid., Tab 21.

74.	Ibid., Tab 20.

75.	Ibid., Tab 22.

76.	Rad., Naval Commander, Northwest African Waters to COMINCH, 15 April 1943, in Three Essays, Tab III F. See also discussion of status of Port Lyautey in Roberts Ltrs., Tab 17.

77.	Roberts Ltrs., Tab 26. The term "Wing" refers to the temporary organization of the 480th Group as the 2037th Antisubmarine Wing (Prov.)

78.	Ibid.

79.	Ibid., Tab 28, 1.

80.	Ibid., 3.

81.	Ibid., Tabs 16, 19, and 23.

82.	Ibid., passim.

83.	Ibid., Tab 30.

84.	Ibid., Tab 16.

85.	Ibid., Tab 28.

86,	Ibid., Tab 20.

87.	Report for Brig. Gen. H. M. McCelland from Dr. J. R. Pellam, about 5 Sep. 1943 [Pellam Report], in Three Essays, Tab III D, 9-10.

88.	Roberts Ltrs., Tab 32 et passim.

89.	For more figures on British action see Three Essays, Tab III E. For additional information regarding Navy planes, see Analysis ASWORG, 4.

90.	Ibid.

91.	Ltr., Dr. Pellam to ASWORG, 10 June 1943, in Three Essays, Tab III D. The tendency for submarines to move outward, in direct proportion

251

to the range of effective air patrol, is evident from the following table of estimated average U-boat density in the area according to zone distances from the North African and Gibraltar bases.

Date	0-200 Miles	200-400 Miles	400-600 Miles	600-800 Miles	800- Miles	Total
NOV.	8.3	7.7	3.4	1.3	0.7	21.4
DEC.	2.9	4.2	5.6	4.0	2.8	19.5
JAN.	1.6	0.7	3.1	5.1	4.7	15.2
FEB.	1.2	2.8	5.2	5.7	5.0	19.9
MAR.	1.5	2.7	2.1	2.6	3.3	12.2
APR.	1.1	1.5	3.1	2.3	1.8	9.8
MAY	0.7	1.4	2.0	1.9	1.0	7.0
JUNE	0.5	0.7	1.6	1.9	3.8	8.5
JULY	1.0	2.9	3.6	5.3	8.3	21.1
AUG.	0.3	0.6	1.9	4.3	5.8	12.9

Figures adapted from Analysis, ASWORG, 12 Aug. 1943, and History 480th Gp.

92.

Roberts Ltrs., Tab 16.

93.

Ibid., Tab 20, 4.

94.

See Map of activity in the Moroccan Sea Frontier, following p. 123.

95.

Pellam Report, 3-4.

96.

The Admiralty estimated that 80 per cent of the enemy craft rated "probably sunk" never reach port.

97.

History, 480th Gp., 29. Cf. App. 2, which lists nine ineffective attacks.

98.

Analysis, ASWORG, 12 Aug. 1943.

99.

Ibid.

100.

Pellam Report.

101.

Ibid.

102.

See App. 3, Cf. figures given in History, 480th Gp., 31-33, which are apparently the result of confusing operations in Africa with those in both England and Africa.

103.

History, 480th Gp., 28, Cf. Analysis, ASWORG, 22 July 1943, 13.

104.

Ibid., 7.

252

105.	Ibid., 9.

106.	Ibid., 7.

107.	Ibid., Tables 1 and 3.

108.	Ibid., 16-19.

109.	Ibid., 16, Table 3.

110.	MIR, Aug. 1943, 16.

111.	See tables, Order of Battle, A/S Forces, in App. 7, this study. During the July activity, three planes of the 480th Group based at Agadir were recalled to Port Lyautey. Coastal Command aircraft sank one submarine and attacked five others in the Gibraltar area, late June to 31 July 1943. MIR, July 1943, 13.

112.	Ibid., 5-6.

113.	Telephone conversation, Col. McHenry to McNarney in AAFAC files (unnumbered). Roberts Ltrs., Tab 19.

114.	Ibid., Tab 32.

115.	Notes on 93rd Meeting, CCS, 22 May 1943, ref. CCS 241/1, 22 May 1943.

116.	History, 15th Antisubmarine Squadron, 10, in AAFAC file H0214. See maps of squadron locations, following p. 40.

117.	MIR, March 1943, 7.

118.	The above data, and that following, unless given more specific reference, is taken from MIR.

119.	Ibid., May 1943, 7.

120.	See Table, North American Theater, App. 2, this study.

121.	See Chapter IV, this study, for discussion of the training program.

122.	MIR, Feb. 1943, 7; March 1943, 7.

123.	See Action Status Reports, AAFAC, for given dates, in AAFAC file 241.1.

124.	Annex #2 to Movement order #1, 26th AWIG, 27 Feb. 1943; Annex #1 to Movement Order #4, 26th AWIG, 5 April 1943; both in AAFAC file "Operations Cuba" (unnumbered). See also paper entitled "History of Enemy Action" in "Preliminary Study of the Caribbean Area," in AAFAC files (unnumbered).

253

125.	Copy in AAFAC file 774.

126.	See movement orders in AAFAC files 774, 771, 773.

127.	Movement Order #1, 26th AWIG, 27 Feb. 1943, in AAFAC file "Operations, Cuba" (unnumbered).

128.	See MIR monthly accounts of activity in this area.

129.	Interview with Maj. S. D. McElroy, CO 4th Antisubmarine Sq., 12 Feb. 1944, in AFFAC file 573.

130.	Ltr., Maj. L. E. Holstead, CO 7th A/S Sq. to CO 26th AWIG, 25 May 1943, in AAFAC file "Operations Trinidad" (unnumbered), MIR July 1943.

131.	Paper entitled "9th in Trinidad," 5, in AAFAC file 763.2.

132.	Ibid., 3. See also note by Lt. Dattilio in "Preliminary Study of the Caribbean Area."

133.	For data on the command situation, see organizational charts in Preliminary Study, ltr., Hq. AAFAC to CG AAF, 8 May 1943, in AAFAC file "Operations, Trinidad"; History 7th A/S Sq., in AAFAC file H-206.

134.	Ltr., Hq., Antilles Air Task Force, to CO 26th AWIG, 25 March 1943 in AAFAC file 761.

135.	Ltr., Lt. C. W. Havens to Maj. Gomez, 6 Dec. 1942, in AAFAC file 763; History, 7th A/S Sq. 153; ltr., Maj. Gen. E. J. House, CG AATF to Col. H. A. Halverson, CO 26th AWIG, 29 March 1943, in "Operations Trinidad,"; Weekly Report, CO 23rd A/S Sq. to CO 26th AWIG, 22 Aug. 1943, in same file.

136.	MIR, Jan. 1943, 5.

137.	Ltr., CO 9th A/S Sq., to CO 26th AWIG, 29 Dec. 1942, in AAFAC file 763.

138.	MIR, Jan. 1943, 5.

139.	Ltr., CO 9th A/S Sq. to CO 26th AWIG, 29 Dec. 1942, in AAFAC file 763.

140.	MIR, March 1943. See Table, Latin American Theater, App. 2, this study.

141.	Ltr., Hq. AAFAC to CG AAF, 4 March 1943, in AAFAC file 763.

254

142.	Movement order #2, 26th AWIG, 13 March 1943, in AAFAC file 761.

143.	History, 7th A/S Sq., 154. See Status Reports, AAFAC, in file 241.1. An extra B-18 was sent out, and 8 were equipped with MAD.

144.	MIR, monthly reports on operations in the area.

145.	History, 7th A/S Sq., 155.

146.	MIR, July 1943, 13.

147.	Ibid., 36, and Aug. 1943, 16. The normal strength of the 8th Squadron was 16 B-24D, radar-equipped planes. Status Reports, in AAFAC file 240.1.

148.	MIR, Aug. 1943. The Navy wished to keep this unit in the area until the equipment could be thoroughly tested. Memo for all AC/AS from AFREQ, 27 Oct. 1943, in AAG 384.7-B.

149.	See Chap. II n. 7.

150.	See documents in "Preliminary Study of the Caribbean Area."

151.	Ltr., Hq. AAFAC to CG AAF, 24 April 1943, in AAFAC file 781.

152.	Memo for AFOCR from AFAEP, 4 May 1943, in Plans III-R-2 Bk. 1.

153.	Ltr., Lt. Col. H. S. Beeks to Col. H. A. Halverson, CO 26th AWIG, 2 June 1943, in AAFAC file, Operations, Ascension Island, (unnumbered).

154.	Joint Directive, JCS to Comdr. S. Atlantic Force and CG S. Atlantic, 4 June 1943, in AAFAC file, Operations, Ascension Island.

155.	Ltr., Lt. Col. Beeks to CO 26th AWIG, 27 June 1943, in AAFAC file, Operations, Ascension Island.

156.	Report, Lt. Col. Beeks to CO 26th AWIG, 9 Aug. 1943 in AAFAC file, Operations, Ascension Island.

157.	Ltr., President to C/S and COMINCH, 18 March 1943, in AAFAC files 001.1 and Operations, Newfoundland (unnumbered).

158.	Corrected draft of memo for the President from C/S, and COMINCH, n.d. (external evidence established 19 March 1943) in AAFAC file 001.1. See also below, n. 159.

159.	Memo for AC/S OPD from AC/AS A-3, 20 March 1943, in AAFAC file 001.1.

160.	Ltr., Air Member, Canadian Joint Staff to Arnold, 5 Jan. 1943, in AAFAC file 575.

255

161.	R&R, comment 1, AFRDB to AC/AS, A-3 12 Jan. 1943, basic ltr. in preceding note. It was reported that there was in Canada "a noticeable undertone of disappointment" that the AAFAC did not take over the task before the RAF. Ltr., Maj. J. P. Healy, Liaison Officer to RCAF, to CG EDC, 22 Jan. 1943, in AAFAC file 575.

162.	ACC-3.

163.	R&R, comment 3, AC/AS, MM&D to Bomb. Br., AFRAQ, 30 March 1943, in AAFAC file 001.01.

164.	Ltr., Bomb. Br., AFREQ to CG AAFAC, 2 April 1943, in AAFAC file 001.1.

165.	R&R, comment 4, AFRDB, to AC/AS A-3, 12 Feb. 1943, in AAFAC file, Operations, Newfoundland. At the request of COMINCH, 12 B-17's were ordered to Newfoundland, 28 January 1943, to reinforce this squadron which was in turn to reinforce the coverage normally provided by Catalinas when convoys were attacked. Ltr., AFRDB to CG AAFAC, 28 Jan. 1943, in same file.

166.	Ltr., AFRDB to CG AAFAC, 25 Jan. 1943, in AAFAC file, Operations, Newfoundland.

167.	REport entitled "Survey of Greenland as an Operating Base for Antisubmarine Operations," 27 Feb. 1943, in AAFAC file 577.

168.	Ibid., 3.

169.	Above data taken from Review of Antisubmarine Intelligence, Detachment, 35th AWIG, April 1943 in AAFAC file 576.33; and History, 479th Gp., iv-v.

170.	Memo., Hq. AAFAC to all concerned, 25 June 1943, in AAFAC file, OPerations, Newfoundland.

171.	Review of A/S Intel., April 1943, 1.

172.	Memo for CG AAF from AC/S, 23 April 1943, in AAG 384. 7-A.

173.	RCAF Eastern Air Command Monthly Antisubmarine Reports, in AAFAC file 50-F (2). The RCAF maintained about 11 squadrons in the Nova Scotia-Newfoundland area, with 2 to 3 regularly on duty from Gander and Torbay. See also Rad., Larson to AFABI, 20 April 1943 in AAFAC file, Operations Newfoundland.

174.	Rad., Larson to CO Detafsub, and CO 6th A/S Sq., 24 June 1943, in AAFAC file OPerations, Newfoundland.

175.	See diagram of U-boat disposition in North Atlantic Antisubmarine Intelligence, May 1943, in AAFAC file 576.33.

256

176.	Review of A/S Intel., April 1943.

177.	MIR, April 1943, 4-6. The figures given here are not final.

178.	N. Atlantic A/S Intel., May 1943, 8.

179.	Memo for CPS, (no signature) 15 Jan. 1943, in AAFAC file 577.

180.	See report on these investigations in AAFAC file 577.

181.	Ltr., Col. H. Moore to CO 25th AWIG, 19 May 1943, in AAFAC file, Operations, Newfoundland.

182.	Colonel Moore conducted an experimental flight to Greenland and Iceland during which he dropped off two officers at BW-1 to set up a control room there. The rest of the control personnel arrived later. Ltr., Col. Moore to CO 25th AWIG, 4 May 1944, in AAFAC file, Operations, Newfoundland.

183.	Except where otherwise specified, the following tactical procedures are taken from Antisubmarine Manual,. SOP III-I, AAFAC, 29 July 1943, in AAFAC file 231.1.

184.	Air Tactics in Antisubmarine Warfare, Bureau of Aeronautics, USN, 30 July 1943, 14, in AAFAC file, Tactical Policies (unnumbered).

185.	See typical chart of a day's operations off Africa, following p. 157.

186.	For pattern, see SOP III-2, 2 June 1943, in AAFAC file 231.1.

187.	Colors varied according to the theater. See discussion in Monthly Reports of the Research Coordinator, AAFAC, in AAFAC file 400.1; correspondence in AAFAC file 402.

188.	Air Tactics in Antisubmarine Warfare, 15.

189.	MIR., June 1943, 40-41.

190.	Ibid., Jan. 1943, 20.

191.	Ibid., March 1943, 24-27.

192.	Ibid., Feb. 1943, 15-16.

193.	Ibid., 18-19.

194.	Ibid., April 1943, 29.

195.	Ibid., May 1943, 38.

257

196.	Ibid., June 1943, 47.

197.	Ibid., 49.

198.	Ibid., 50.

199.	Ibid., 51.

200.	Ibid., 55.

201.	Ibid., 57.

202.	Ibid., Aug. 1943, 30-1.

203.	Ibid., July 1943, 32-3.

204.	Ibid., Aug. 1943, 31-2.

205.	Ibid., 35.

206.	See above, Chap. II.

207.	Ltr., AAG to Larson, 28 Dec. 1942, in AAFAC file 001.1.

208.	Standish Report, Conclusion, 17, figures quoted from A-3 Report, I Bomber Comd. 11 Oct. 1943.

209.	Report, I Bomber Comd. to CG AAF, 18 Oct. 1943, in AAFAC file 100.02.

210.	Standish Report, Conclusion 18. Attacks and assessment are from COMINCH and are corrected to date according to U. S. Fleet Antisubmarine Bulletin. Operational data from AAFAC and I BOmber Comd. reports to AAF, 19 April and 18 Oct. 1943.

211.	This analysis, and the remarks following are taken from ibid. 19-20.

212.	Ibid., 26.

213.	Ibid., 27. Figures from A-2, I Bomber Comd. They include all operations prior to the withdrawal of the two groups in November 1943.

214.	Data corrected to 5 Sep. 1943. U. S. Fleet Antisubmarine Bulletin, Sep. 1943, 12, in AAFAC file 224.

215.	Ltr., Hq. AAFAC to CG AAF, n.d., in Plans III-R-2, Bk. 1; 1st ind., same ltr., Hq. AAF to CG AAFAC, 21 June 1943 which vetoes the plan contained in basic communication.

216.	Report, I Bomber Comd. to CG AAF, 18 Oct. 1943.

CHAPTER IV

1.	Ltr., Hq. AAFAC to all units, AAFAC, 21 April 1943; ltr., Hq. AAFAC to CG AAF, 22 April 1943; ltr., AC/AS, MM&D to CG ASC, 15 May 1943; all in AAFAC file 249.01.

2.	Historical Report of Supply and Logistics Subsec., A-4 Hq. AAFAC, n.d., in AAFAC file 915.3.

3.	Ltr., Hq. AAFAC to CG AAF, 18 Nov. 1942, in AAFAC file 247.02.

4.	Historical Report of Ordnance Sec. Hq. AAFAC, n.d., 3-4 in AAFAC file 246.1.

5.	Ibid., 3.

6.	Of. ltr., Hq. AAFAC to CG AAF, 18 Nov. 1942 and 1st ind., Hq. AAF to CG AAFAC, 2 Dec. 1942, in AAFAC file 247.02.

7.	Report, Supply and Logistics Subsec. 2-3.

8.	Except where otherwise specified, this account of communications is taken from Historical Report, Signal Sec., AAFAC, in AAFAC file 919.

9.	This system was adopted, substantially, by the Navy. Ibid. 2.

10.	See correspondence in AAFAC file 918.

11.	See below, n. 27.

12.	For T/O 1-1017, see AAFAC file 919. This squadron on 30 August 1943 consisted of 18 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 209 enlisted men. Report in ibid.

13.	Memo for Giles from AFREQ, n.d., in AAFAC file Operations, Newfoundland.

14.	Interview with Maj. McElroy, 12 Feb. 1944.

15.	Ltr., Lt. Col. D. E. Muehleisen, AC/S A-3, Hq. 25th ASWIG to CG AAFAC, 8 May 1943, in AAFAC file 570.3.

16.	Memo for Giles from AFREQ. See n. 8, Chap. III.

17.	Ibid.

18.	See above, Chap. III.

19.	See above, Chap. II.

260

20.	Ltr., Hq. AAFAC to CG AAF, 5 April 1943, in AAFAC file 560.1.

21.	Memo for Giles from AFREQ. See n. 8, Chap. III.

22.	R&R, comment 1, 13 April 1943, Bomb. Br., AFREQ to Allocations and Programs Div., AFOCR, and comment 2, Allocations and Program Div. to Bomb. Branch, AFREQ, in AAFAC file 241.8.

23.	As shipping lanes continued to increase in the spring of 1942, Dr. Edward L. Bowles, technical advisor to the Assistant Secretary of War for Air, urged that every effort be made to develop radar as the most promising of the new antisubmarine weapons. Memo for S/W from Dr. Bowles 20 May 1942, in AAFAC files 113.3. General Arnold, on 30 May 1942, ordered the Director of Technical Services to establish the SADU with headquarters at Langley Field. Its mission was declared (1) to be the development of tactics and technique of antisubmarine warfare, using all special devices available or under development, (2) to act as an experimental group, (3) to participate in search and attack, and (4) to train crews in the use of antisubmarine devices and techniques. It was placed under the command of the Commanding General, AAF, with operational control vested in the Commanding General, First Air Force. Ltr., Maj. Gen. N. F. Harmon, C/AS, to AFDTS, 30 May 1942, in AAFAC files 113.3; Maj. Gen. Eisenhower, AC/S to CG AAF, 3 June 1942, in AAFAC file 400.2. The unit was established on 8 June 1942. Constitution Orders, 8 June 1942, AC 320-2 (6-6-42) MR-M-AF; GO #24, 16 June 1942, AAB Langley Field, in AAFAC file 400.2. Although radar provided the principal challenge to research the new organization attacked a large number of technical problems. On 27 January 1943, Col. W. C. Dolan, commanding officer of the unit, reported 58 projects of which 34 had already been completed, mostly dealing with improvements in locating instruments, in aids to navigation and communication, and in lethal agents. SADU maintained liaison with the several research agencies, working on related projects for both Army and Navy. See History, 1st Sea-Search Attack Group, in AFIHI files 1878-21.

24.	Historical Report by Col. E. R. Casey, Research Coordinator, AAFAC, Aug. 1943, in AAFAC file 400.

25.	Ibid., 2.

26.	Ibid.

27.	Historical Report of Col. R. C. Kugel, officer in charge of training, Hq. AAFAC, n.d., 20, in AAFAC files.

28.	Historical Report by Research Coordinator, 6. See also Reports of the Research Coordinator, 20 Jan. 1943, 3 March 1943, 5 May 1943, 3 June 1943 for all technical developments, in AAFAC file 400.1.

261

29.	Historical Report, Signal; Sec., AAFAC, n.d., 7-9, in AAFAC file 919.

30.	Antisubmarine Monthly Summary, Dec. 1942, 18; Reports of Research Coordinator, 5 May 1943, 3-4, 20 Jan. 1943, 4, 11 June 1943, 4.

31.	Historical Report by Research Coordinator, 7. MAD was used effectively by the 1st Sea-Search Attack Group, 22 of its total of 43 sightings having been obtained by this equipment. Being an experimental unit, this group received and tested devices long before they were approved for use by the AAFAC or tested fully under overseas conditions. History, 1st Sea-Search Attack Group, 21 and Bk. II, in AFIFI files, 1878-21.

32.	Ibid., 6.

33.	Ibid.

34.	Report of Research Coordinator, 11 June 1943.

35.	Ibid., 10 July 1943.

36.	Historical Report by Research Coordinator, 7.

37.	Ibid. Correspondence on these projects is contained in AAFAC files 404, Marine Markers; 408, Air-Sea Rescue; and 402, Camouflage.

38.	Standish Report, Conclusion, 12.

39.	For data on the B-24 modification, see Historical Report by Research Coordinator; Report of Capt. McGuffin on the Modified B-24, n.d. in AAFAC file 241.42; MIR, June 1943, 37; correspondence in AAFAC file 241.42.

40.	Historical Report by Research Coordinator, 7-8. Cf. R&R, AFAEP to AC/AS Training, 5 June 1943, in AAFAC file 001.1.

41.	Ibid., 4.

42.	MIR, Aug. 1943, 38.

43.	Historical Report of Research Coordinator, 4-5.

44.	Ibid., 9.

45.	The following account of training programs deals only with that aspect of the subject under the direct supervision of Headquarters, AAFAC. Special training problems encountered in overseas operations are dealt with in Chapter III in connection with the respective campaigns. The account here presented, unless otherwise specified, is taken from the Historical Report, Training (see above, n. 27). See also Monthly Antisubmarine Summary, Dec. 1942, 27-28.

262

46.	The 516th, 518th, 519th, 520th, 521st, and 522nd Observation Sqds., formerly of the I Air Support Command, equipped with O-46, O-52, and O-47 type aircraft.

47.	Report of A-3, I Bomber Command., 11 Oct. 1943, quoted in Standish Report.

48.	Ltr., AFRDB to CG AAFAC, 10 March 1943, in AAFAC file 241.8.

49.	This account of radar training is based on a historical report on the subject submitted by the Signal Section, AAFAC, in AAFAC file 919.





	BIBLIOGRAPHICAL STATEMENT


	The basic sources for this study were collected by the historian of the Antisubmarine Command and left in the custody of the Historical Division. In addition to this file, several other War Department repositories have provided vital information. A glance at the footnote citations will determine in detail the sources used.










	263

Click the icons to view the associated records

	Return to the Army Antisubmarine Command History page